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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 00230

GENEVA FOR USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UK, UR, NATO

SUBJ: INF: UK REPORT ON SOVIET DEMARCHE ON GENEVA
INF NEGOTIATIONS.

REF: (A) USNATO 0156, (B) USNATO 0030

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: UK HAS CIRCULATED TO SCG ALLIES AT NATO A SUMMARY REPORT OF THE CALL BY SOVIET CHARGE IN LONDON ON UK MINISTER OF STATE HURD DECEMBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE THIRD ROUND OF THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS. UK REPORT, TEXT OF WHICH IS BELOW, INDICATES THE SOVIET APPROACH IS ALONG THE LINES OF SIMILAR DEMARCHES REPORTED EARLIER BY THE GERMANS AND BELGIANS (REFTELS). THE SOVIET APPROACH REPORTED BELOW EMPHASIZES (PARA 5) THE NEED TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET MISSILE SUB-CEILING OFFER. HOWEVER THIS MAY REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE DEMARCHE TOOK PLACE ON DECEMBER 21, THE SAME DAY ANDROPOV WENT PUBLIC WITH THE SUB-CEILING OFFER. UK MINISTER OF STATE HURD, IN REJECTING THE SOVIET POSITION ON INCLUSION OF UK/FRENCH FORCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, COMMENTS THAT DURING THE SALT TALKS, THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES WERE STRATEGIC AND IT WAS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIETS WERE NOW TRYING TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN UK TEXT:

CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY THE SOVIET CHARGE;
21 DECEMBER 1982

PRESENT:

MR. HURD
MR. LAMPORT
MR. FULLER (DEFENCE DEPT.)

MR. DOLGOV
INTERPRETER

1. MR. DOLGOV SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER, THROUGH THE MINISTER, ABOUT

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THE ROUND OF INF TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 30 SEPTEMBER AND 30 NOVEMBER. HE READ THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT FROM HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

2. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAKE THE MOST SERIOUS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN INF AGREEMENT. AT THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD DEVELOPED THEIR PROPOSALS OF 25 MAY AND HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO CONCLUDE A TREATY BY WHICH SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE WOULD BE REDUCED WITHIN 5 YEARS TO THE LEVEL OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES AT THAT TIME. FURTHER REDUCTIONS AFTER THAT DATE WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEVELS OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN SECURITY.

3. THE AMERICANS HAD FROM THE OUTSET OF THE TALKS TRIED TO CAPITALISE ON THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS. THEY COULD NO LONGER DO THIS. THE RUSSIANS' PROPOSALS WOULD AMOUNT TO REDUCTIONS INVOLVING EXACT PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. THE AMERICANS EVIDENTLY HAD NO DESIRE TO REACH THIS SORT OF AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED TO DEMAND EQUAL CEILINGS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET FORCES WHICH TOOK NO ACCOUNT OF FRENCH AND BRITISH FORCES, I.E. THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THEIR MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS WITHOUT THE AMERICANS MAKING ANY REDUCTIONS IN THEIRS. THIS WAS QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

4. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT PROPOSING THAT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SHOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES. BUT IT HAD TO BE ACCEPTED THAT THESE FORCES WERE A COMPONENT PART OF THE EUROPEAN FORCES ON THE NATO SIDE. IT WAS TIME TO LOOK SOBERLY AT THIS ISSUE.

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5. THE AMERICANS CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE

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AIRCRAFT. THIS CLAIM WAS UNFOUNDED. PREVIOUS US/USSR AGREEMENTS SHOWED IT WAS POSSIBLE TO LIMIT AIR FORCES. THE US PREOCCUPATION WITH MISSILES PROVED THAT THEY WERE INTENT ON AGREEING REDUCTIONS ONLY ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND NOT THEIR OWN. THE ARGUMENT THAT SOME OF THEIR AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE WERE DUAL CAPABLE DID NOT STAND UP; AN AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS NUCLEAR CAPABLE REMAINED SUCH WHATEVER ITS OTHER ROLES. THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ALSO HAD NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. THE AMERICANS' STAND ON THIS ISSUE WAS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR LACK OF WILLINGNESS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. THEY CONTINUED TO TRY TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS AN IMBALANCE IN MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE WHICH FAVOURED THE SOVIET UNION. BUT IT WAS DEMONSTRABLE THAT A BALANCE EXISTED. THE AMERICANS WERE NOW TRYING TO INCLUDE SOVIET SHORT RANGE AIRCRAFT IN INF REDUCTIONS. THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN THIS. THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT INCLUDE THEIR MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000 KM; NEITHER WOULD THEY ALLOW REDUCTIONS IN THEIR OWN SHORT RANGE AIRCRAFT.

6. THE AMERICANS DEMANDED THAT INF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE GLOBAL. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE MOST RAPID AND EFFECTIVE WAY TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATION. IT WAS THE PROBLEMS IN EUROPE WHICH WERE SPECIALLY URGENT AND IMMEDIATE. (HERE MR. DOLGOV REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF "ANOTHER CIRCLE OF PARTICIPANTS"). DURING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS THE AMERICANS HAD MADE NOT ONE STEP FORWARD FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. THE ZERO OPTION WAS UNREALISTIC AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. BY STICKING TO IT THE AMERICANS PROVED THAT THEY WERE NOT SERIOUS IN THEIR DESIRE FOR THE TALKS TO BE SUCCESSFUL; THEY WANTED ONLY TO DEPLOY THEIR MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. AMERICAN INSISTENCE ON THE ZERO OPTION WAS LEADING TO FRUITLESS MARKING OF TIME AT THE TALKS. THE SOVIET UNION WISHED BRITAIN TO DRAW RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS.

7. MR. HURD THANKED MR. DOLGOV FOR A LONG AND CLEAR

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ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION. IT WAS A PITY, IF PERHAPS INEVITABLE, THAT THERE SHOULD BE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AT THE SAME TIME AS THEIR PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS. THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE SERIOUS IF SLOW. ON THE INFORMATION HE HAD RECEIVED WE WERE LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN THE SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION WOULD SUGGEST. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT DESPAIR OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE TALKS.

8. MR. HURD DREW MR. DOLGOV'S ATTENTION TO HIS OWN STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 15 DECEMBER ON THE QUESTION OF THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS FALSE TO TRY TO EQUATE THE SOVIET LAND BASED MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC FORCES. THE RUSSIANS HAD, DURING THE SALT I NEGOTIATIONS, INSISTED THAT THESE FORCES WERE STRATEGIC. BRITAIN AGREED WITH THIS. IT WOULD NOT BE EASILY UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN WHY THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO BRING THESE FORCES INTO THE INF EQUATION.

9. MR. HURD REAFFIRMED THAT BRITAIN WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE INF TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE ON A SERIOUS BASIS. THERE WERE PRIZES OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES. BRITAIN WOULD USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT HAD TO BRING ABOUT A SERIOUS CONCLUSION TO THE TALKS. THE ANALYSIS PUT FORWARD BY MR. DOLGOV WOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY AND WE WOULD TAKE UP ANY FURTHER POINTS ARISING FROM IT.

10. MR. DOLGOV SAID THAT HIS CALL WAS PART OF A CONTINUING SERIES OF BRIEFINGS AS THE TALKS PROGRESSED. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET SIDE THAT PUBLICISED CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.

END TEXT. BENNETT

END OF MESSAGE

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